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FINANCIAL DEREGULATION AND ECONOMIC DISTRESS: IS THERE A FUTURE 
FOR FINANCIAL CO-OPERATIVES?
1 





The last years have witnessed a wide reshaping of the banking scene. According to 
researchers  and  authorities,  the  aftermath  of  these  developments  include  an 
increased  risk  of  demarketing  of  the  conventional  banking  system  towards  certain 
customer  segmentations  and  marginal  areas  and  activities.  Recently  the  banking 
scene has deteriorated, especially at the local level, as the financial crisis increased 
the scarcity of readily available, sufficient and reliable services. Behind the current 
crisis  seems  to  be  the  influential  corporate  governance  of  dominant  financial 
institutions, which introduced innovative products that resulted in less transparency 
and created uncertainty and a lack of trust toward and within the financial system. 
 
The  present  paper  argues  that  this  new  reality  can  be  thought  of  as  giving  new 
opportunities  for  financial  co-operatives  to  increase  their  importance  among  the 
market and  areas  that they  historically  serve.  The  paper bases  its analysis  on the 
development pattern of the financial co-operatives of Italy and Greece and outlines 
the  critical  path  that  the  financial  co-operatives  should  follow  in  order  to  provide 
efficient  (and  crucial  for  local  development  banking)  services  and  products.  It  is 
argued that these changes can be exploited only if the financial co-operatives would 
be able to transform without losing their basic values. Further, this route goes through 
the development of new strategies and in certain cases of the modernization of their 
services. The authors also stress and define the risk of failing that might hinder the 
co-operative movement, as the huge potential of co-operative endeavors are rarely 
“translated” to gains automatically.  
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1. The banking scene before and after the crisis in the European context 
 
The financial system around the globe has undergone radical changes in the last two 
decades. If we confine our analysis to the banking sector, which still is its backbone, 
changes have been in size, in manner of operation and in organisational structure. 
The leading forces for these can be traced among the rapid progress in information 
and communication technology, financial innovation, deregulation and decrease of the 
role  of  the  States,  growing  international  openness,  and  changes  in  demand  for 
banking  and  financial  services  which  have  all  led  to  stronger  competition  and 
prompted a far-reaching process of concentration among banking institutions and a 
rationalization of their productive structures. 
 
The long trend of mergers and acquisitions (M&A), which has involved every type and 
dimension  of  banking,  has  led  to  an  increase  in  the  average  size  of  banks,  more 
complex and structured forms of group organisation, and a diversification of customer 
relation  policies  and  methods.  M&As  can  be  considered,  first  of  all,  as  reaction  to 
changes  in  market  structure:  for  big  banks  a  possible  solution  to  needs  of  re-
positioning; for smaller banks to needs of scale economies and preventive defence 
against takeovers (Belaisch et al., 2001; ECB, 2000 and 2001). 
 
On the other hand, the new banks originated by M&A may suffer scale diseconomies 
towards  smaller  customers,  lenders  and  borrowers,  more  dependent  on  personal 
relationships: SMEs, families, unskilled workers, unemployed, women, young people, 
elders (Berger et al. 2001; Leyshon and Thrift, 1993 and 1995). 
 
Since mainstream banking institutions either are lacking the spatial configuration to 
serve local markets or withdrawing from local markets, as a result of a reengineering 
process that their cost-rationalization strategies compel (restructuring for profit), the 
risk of a de-marketing of their retail branches from some sectors of the population 
and from peripheral areas and activities becomes evident. These strategies included: 
a)  minimum  loan  sizes;  b)  tiered  interest  rated  giving  very  low  interest  on 
savings/deposit accounts with low balances; c) account maintenance charges on low 
balance  deposit accounts;  and  d)  use  of credit scoring  systems  leading  to outright 
refusal to grant loans or to open some types of accounts. 
 
Even when operative at local level, mainstream banks are most likely to apply more 
secure loan policies based on standardized credit, screening and monitoring and focus 
on market segments that offer them advanced opportunities for profits under a “less-
risky”  lending  policy.  Cost-considerations  again  prevent  them  from  “investing”  in 
relationship-based  transactions,  necessary  to  address  informational  opaque 
borrowers. Relationship lending might be considered as contrary to their standardized 
credit policies, which are based on easily observed, verifiable and transmittable data, 
i.e. pure transactions lending. Thus, because of physical or “informational” distance, 
mainstream banks are not efficient in generating borrower specific information, which, 
in addition, due to its “soft” characteristics, may be difficult to transmit through the 
communicating  channels  of  large  institutions.  Many  potential  borrowers  are  so 
dismissed because they do not have credit records, enough collateral and are asking 
for not profitable small loans. 
 
The European integration has played a significant role in this restructuring process, 
and it is not likely to change substantially the segmentation of the banking market   4 
 
 
and its different levels of competition. As a consequence the distribution of its benefit 
will be uneven. Its impact will differ, according to banks size: lesser for the larger 
ones,  since  they  are  long  exposed  to  international  competition,  substantial  for  the 
middle  ones,  which  will  be  exposed  to  an  increased  competition,  and  even  more 
significant, at least initially, for the local ones (European Central Bank, 2001). 
 
The financial market crisis, that broke out in the summer of 2007 and grew worse 
after September 2008, can not be separated from the afore said structural change, 
since it is also a consequence of the bad governance of the change, or of the inability, 
and in some cases even unwillingness, to institute new forms of governance, fitted to 
the new context. In broad terms, we may find the origin of the crisis in the global 
trade  and  financial  unbalances;  the  past  USA  monetary  policy  and  the  following 
excess  of  liquidity;  the  increased  investors‟  attitude  towards  risk;  the  bulging 
expectations on real estate and stocks values, and the following speculative bubbles 
(Targetti and Fracasso, 2008). 
 
If  we  restrain  to  the  financial  sector,  the  crisis  seems  to  be  articulated  around  a 
number  of  financial  innovations  and  reckless  behaviours  aimed  to  give  the  credit 
system  more  elasticity,  to  the  detriment  of  transparency:  securitisation  of  loans, 
financial  disintermediation,  structuring  of  credit  claims,  risk  reduction  of  financial 
institutions, bank loans granted incautiously, low information on debtors‟ conditions, 
huge increase of out of budget activities by banks, reckless behaviour and conflict of 
interests  by  rating  agencies,  emergence  of  many  financial  operators  not  liable  to 
control  by  authorities.  All  these  innovations  and  misbehaviours  have  ingenerated 
growing  uncertainty  that  has  damaged  trust  for  and  within  the  banking  system
3, 
increasing the cost of capital and depressing economy (GFSR, 2007; BEBdI, 2008). 
 
Four aspects should be stressed: 
1.  the development of “innovative” complicated products has nothing to do with 
the usual and simple banking behaviour; 
2.  the crisis has showed the limits of the dominating theory of complete markets 
and perfect information that foresees an effective “self-regulation” capacity of 
the financial system, which led to the retreat of the state and the regulation 
authorities. It is significant that the most authoritative analyses conducted to 
date  highlight  the  central  role  of  governance  arrangements  and  risk 
management systems for the stability of individual institutions and the financial 
system as a whole. The reforms that legislators and authorities are called upon 
to carry out, at various supranational and national levels, have to be based on 
“common  rules”  and  a  greater  role  for  “organisational  and  corporate 
governance” variables (Ferri, 2008); 
3.  even after the channelling of billions of euros in the banking circuit, the problem 
still remains, as it seems that the money has difficulties in reaching the real 
economy. Banks still are rationing credit, in particular to SMEs, because of their 
opacity and lack of collaterals, but also because of banks incapacity to evaluate 
projects and screen firms; 
4.  mainstream banks do not seem to have learned from the crisis: banks budgets 
are still opaque and highly risky behaviour has restarted, as it is shown by the 
prompt revival in 2009 of junk bonds, hedge funds, and futures. 
 
 
                                                 
3 How can a bank that does not know the volume of the consequences within its own organisation, trust the interbank 
market?   5 
 
 
2. Co-operative banking in Europe: recent trends 
 
Co-operative banks are a key component of the co-operative movement in the credit 
sector,  which  originated  in  Europe  in  the  nineteenth  century  as  a  response  to  the 
problems that small urban and rural businesses had in obtaining credit. From the very 
first  credit  unions  promoted  by  Schulze-Delitzsch  and  Raiffeisen,  they  adopted  an 
organisational model based on democratic governance and mutualism. In time, this 
model evolved and differentiated into a multiplicity of institutions with characteristics 
reflecting the needs of co-operative members on the one hand and the specificities of 
national legislative frameworks on the other.  
Today,  the  co-operative  credit  sector  in  Europe  embraces  systems  that  are  not 
entirely uniform in terms of legal set-up, size and organisation. Some systems are 
strongly  integrated.  This  is  the  case  in  Germany,  where  the  Volksbanken  and 
Raiffeisenbanken are joined in a single trade association and have common central 
structures (DZ Bank), and in the Netherlands, whose co-operative banks are gathered 
together in the Rabobank group, one of the country‟s largest banking groups. Other 
systems are more highly diversified, as in France, whose co-operative system includes 
three of the country‟s five largest banking groups (Crédit Agricole, Caisse d’Épargne 
and Crédit Mutuel) plus the Banques Populaires group consisting of a federal bank and 
20 regional banks with more than 3,000 branches.  
Co-operative  banks‟  ability  to  adapt  and  to  grow  in  highly  diverse  economic  and 
institutional environments has made them a substantial part of the banking industry 
in many European countries. Overall, the co-operative banking sector in the European 
Union  counts  more  than  4,000  local  and  regional  banks,  62,000  branches  and  49 
million  members,  with  a  significant  incidence  in  their  national  markets.  Although 
comparing international data involves some difficulty, we can put co-operative banks‟ 
market shares in terms of number of branches at about 60 per cent in France, 50 per 
cent in Austria, 40 per cent in Germany and the Netherlands, and 10 per cent in Spain 
and Portugal. In Italy, the figure is 39 per cent for the entire co-operative banking 
sector (EACB, 2008).  
In  the  other  European  countries,  co-operative  banks  have  developed  mainly  in  a 
context, including the legal and institutional framework, in which central organisations 
play a driving role. In Italy, by contrast, the movement has been marked by greater 
differentiation  between  mutual  banks  (Banche  di  Credito  Cooperativo)  and  popular 
banks (Banche Popolari), with less integration and autonomous paths of development 
being preferred. The first segment of the co-operative banking sector has consolidated 
its  position  in  its  chosen  markets,  focusing  on  internal  growth  and  successfully 
enacting  the  role  of local  bank  with  close  connections  with  the  fabric  of small  and 
medium-sized  enterprises.  The  largest  Banche  Popolari,  on  the  other  hand,  have 
concentrated on external growth, carrying out broad merger programmes, both within 
their category and outside, by acquiring former savings banks, local banks set up in 
the  form  of  public  limited  companies,  and  specialized  banks.  This  has  led  to  the 
formation of medium and large-sized groups that operate beyond regional borders. In 
some cases growth has led to changes in ownership structure − and greater market 
openness − as well as entry into new lines of business (Padoa-Schioppa, 1997)
4. 
                                                 
4 Both growth paths have greatly reinforced the category of co-operative banks as a whole. In the last decade, despite 
a reduction from 56 to 38 in the number of independent Banche Popolari and groups headed by Banche Popolari, 
their market share in Italy has risen from 16.8 to 21.1 per cent of total bank assets, from 15.9 to 21.6 per cent of 
lending to residents and from 21.1 to 27.3 per cent of branches. There has been a parallel sharpening of differences 
within the category. In 1998 the five largest groups headed by Banche Popolari ran an average of 526 branches, while   6 
 
 
Finally, in Greece, although the sector presented a surprisingly dynamic development 
in the „90, is still found in a transitional period. In the nine year period (1998-2007) 
total membership and co-op capital were tripled, assets, loans and deposits were ten 
times bigger and equity capital, pre tax profits and the number of employees grew by 
an annual rate of almost 40,0 per cent. It is important to note that while until 2002 
the absolute figure of loans was steadily above that of deposits, the last five years the 
relevant increase of deposits was higher, even marginally, than that of loans. These 
changes are on the one hand indicative of the importance co-operative banks attribute 
to financing local enterprises and on the other indicate that with time they seem to 
strengthen the links among local population, a fact that results to more local money 
being channelled to cover local needs (Alexopoulos and Davis, 2008).
5 
Each model has its strengths and weaknesses. Close coordination at central level can 
help overcome constraints and inefficiencies due to the small size of individual co -
operative banks. On the other hand, in banking as in other industries, entrepreneurial 
autonomy fosters competition, the quest for innovative solutions, and the ability to 
adapt to the needs of local economies.  
In a rapidly evolving sector, the co -operative banks, for their part, have proved 
extremely  dynamic  while  evolving  in  a  variety  of  directions,  depending  on  their 
different initial situations and the opportunities offered by their local economies.  
There is evidence, however, that the financial co -operative sector has undergone 
radical changes during the last decade. According to the relevant data of the European 
Co-operative  Banking  Association  (Table  1)  although  the  number  of  local  banks 
decreased from 4,567 to 4,162 (i.e. almost 9%) this evolution did not deteriorate 
their local presence nor their penetration to the market. More specifically, during the 
same  period,  the  number  of  banking  outlets  has  increased  by  7.5%,  which  is 
consistent to the co-operative banks orientation to retain strong links and strengthen 
their proximity advantages  within local areas. This seems to be appreciate by local 
societies as during the reference period membership has increased by 11% and total 
clients by more than 25%. This development, of course, strengthened co -operative 
bank assets by more than 37%, added some 38% more deposits which led to a 45% 
more financing to local economies. These simple figures are indicative of a financial 










                                                                                                                                                                  
Banche Popolari not belonging to groups had 16 each; today those figures are respectively 1,340 and 23. The average 
value of the top five groups’ total assets was ten times that of the other Banche Popolari, a ratio that is now close to 
25:1. Of the 16 banking groups headed by Banche Popolari, two are among the top five in Italy in terms of total assets 
and eight are listed on the stock exchange or have at least one listed member. Cf. Tarantola, 2009. 
5 According to the last available data of 31.12.2007, in total, Greek Co-operative Banks employ 1086 persons in 157 
branches  in  order  to  serve  187,347  members.  Their  membership  holds  some  2.61  billion  euros  in  deposits  and 
received from their banks 2.54 billion euros in loans. With total assets of 3.29 billion euros, one sixth of which is own 
(equity) capital, their gross profits were nearly 131.31 million euros and their net pre-tax profits were 56.07 million 
euros. It should be mentioned that in 2007 its market share stood at the levels of 1% (0.8% of assets, 0.9% of deposits 
and 1.0% of loans of the total).   7 
 
 
Table 1 - Main figures of European co-operative banks - EU-25 (2004 & 2007) 
(financial data in million euros) 
 
  2004  2007  % of change 
Local Banks  4567  4162  -8,9 
Banking outlets  58437  62829  7,5 
Members  44500827  49347932  10,9 
Clients  125700769  158750433  26,3 
Assets  3742789  5150218  37,6 
Deposits  1943795  2689309  38,4 
Loans  1888905  2741158  45,1 
EACB, annual reports, own calculations 
 
 
3. Where does this growing demand for co-operative financial services stem 
from?  
 
The  previous  section  has  offered  strong  evidence  for  a  successful  co-operative 
banking paradigm in Europe
6. Moreover, before the current crisis a number of papers 
highlighted the importance of co-operative banks for financial stability in the regions 
they serve, suggesting that co -operative banks have generally lower incentives to 
take on risks and, thus, they tend to adopt less risky strategies (Groeneveld a nd de 
Vries, 2009; Hesse and Cihak, 2007; Fonteyne, 2007). In addition, they conclude that 
co-operative banks seem to be more stable, due to the much lower volatility of the 
co-operative  ban ks‟  returns,  which  more  than  offsets  their  relatively  lower 
profitability. The reason behind the observed lower variability of returns can be found 
in the fact that co-operative banks in normal times pass on most of their returns to 
customers, but are able to recoup that surplus in weaker periods. To some extent, this 
result can also reflect the mutual support mechanisms that many co-operative banks 
have created. 
 
This last remark is focusing on the special features of the co-operative organisation 
model. Historically, the small size of co-operative banks has been balanced by their 
network  organisation  and  the  formation  of  higher  order  organs.  Their  structure  as 
networks  of banks  and  not  as  bank  networks  made  possible  the  expression of the 
advantages deriving from small size. In addition, mutual help and solidarity among 
the autonomous co-operative banks has lessened the negative impacts of small size 
(Wyman, 2008). 
 
The crisis started to shed light to issues that are strongly attached to the philosophy 
of the financial co-operatives, in terms of everyday business. Thus, scholars stress 
that co-operative banks defend consumer interests and their presence and mode of 
operation maximise consumer surplus (Fonteyne, 2007; Ferri, 2008). They focus on 
their ability to offer simple and transparent products, fair priced, better designed to 
meet  local  needs,  in  a  manner  that  ensures  that  risks  are  well  understood  and 
communicated.  Moreover  they  indicate  the  ways  in  which  credit  co-operatives  –
compared to commercial banks – may be helpful at a time of credit crunch: 
  
  they may be less inclined to ration credit to customers; 
                                                 
6 On the competitiveness of CCB in Italy see: Cannari and Signorini, 1997; Clemente, 2001; Di Salvo, Guidi and Mazzilis, 
2004; Pagano and Panunzi, 1997.   8 
 
 
  they may be less prone to raise the loan rate during a time of financial stress; 
  thanks to better capitalization and more prudent lending, credit co-operatives may 
be less  likely to be  distressed themselves and, therefore, may be more able to 
continue assisting their customers in a time of financial stress. 
All  of  the  three  potential  effects  of  the  credit  co-operatives  stem  from  their 




Research  shows  that  in  Italy  Credit  Co -operative  Banks  ( Banche  di  Credito  Co-
operativo)  and  Banche  Popolari  have  exhibited  a  greater  tendency  than  other 
institutes to perform the role of local banks in industrial districts, as well as in non-
district  areas  (Conti  and  Ferri,  1997).  If  one  adds  the  fact that  in most  cases  the 
economics  of  the  small  business  is  indistinct  from  the  domestic  economy  of  the 
entrepreneur,  then  the  fruits  of  the  mutually  beneficial  co-operation  (between  the 
member and his/her co-operative bank) diffuse towards the household and affect its 
prosperity. Hence, the positive effect of the operation of the co-operative institution is 
not merely restrained at the entrepreneurial sphere. It reaches and concerns almost 
spontaneously more dimensions of a communitarian and/or holistic approach of the 
relevant context of analysis (Alexopoulos, 2006).  
 
 
4. New opportunities for co-op banks 
 
Does this new banking environment give new opportunities for co-op banking growth? 
In  general  the  answer  is  positive.  Increase  in  levels  of  concentration  and  banking 
market quotas,  new expansive  strategies  and  processes of rationalization aimed to 
strengthen  competition  leave  uncovered  financial  areas,  that  may  became  prey  of 
local  non  institutional  and  uncontrolled  lenders.  Research  (Berger  et  al.,  2001; 
Ahrendsen et al., 1999) shows that M&A involving big banks lead to loan reduction to 
SMEs; the opposite happens if M&A are among small banks. Thus M&A have important 
side effects, among which to open new spaces and opportunities for new entries or 
small  banks  already  present  on  the  market,  as  a  consequence  of  major  banks  re-
positioning. Historically financial co-ops expand in banking markets that are socially 
and/or  spatially  segmented.  Recent  research  shows  that  in  USA  the  increase 
concentration in retail banks lead to an increase in co-operative credit. The mix of 
community  bonds,  shared  responsibility  and  the  capacity  to  mobilize  local  savings 
allow not only to reduce information asymmetry and solve scale diseconomies due to 
small loans, but to re-establish and strengthen trust towards banking system. 
 
Both structural changes and financial crisis have created a context where, at least at 
the local level, the model of financial intermediation that credit co-operatives follow is 
encouraged to flourish: there are certain sections of the population that face increased 
difficulties to gain access to the financial system, while some peripheral communities 
and sectors are confronted with a more-restricted set of options. Such a context is 
indicative of the role that credit co-operatives can play in “plugging the gap between 
local need and the mainstream services”. But the real questions are: how can this be 
achieved, how can co-op banks capitalise their competitive advantages and which are 
their competitive advantages? 
 
                                                 
7 On relationship banking see: Berger and Udell, 1990; Di Salvo, Lopez and Pezzotta, 2004; Harhoff and Körtring, 1998; 
Petersen and Rajan, 1994.   9 
 
 
In our opinion Credit Co-operative Banks should stress to become true local banks, 
meaning by this not only a proximity bank and/or a relational bank, but a financial 
institution rooted in the territory, with intensive relationship with the territory, able to 
support local economic activities evaluated inside a pattern of development. For this 
purpose, the bank‟s decisional bodies must be “in the territory”, i.e. have both a good 
knowledge of the socio-economic reality (strengths, weaknesses and possible paths) 
and  privileged  relationships  with  local  economic  categories.  To  set  an  example,  a 
normal relational bank would grant credit to a small entrepreneur on the basis of long 
time knowledge of trust in repayments, also with few collaterals (on the basis of moral 
collaterals). A true local bank would also extend credit in more cases if it could be able 
to understand the potentialities of the investment, in general and specifically for the 
territory. In this sense, the local bank could be regarded also as an agent of social 
change and development (Goglio, 2009). 
 
The  new  context  places  indeed  imperative  challenges  to  financial  co-operatives, 
forcing to a deep thinking on their general and local strategies, on their daily activity, 
both with members and customers, on their loyalty to constitutive social principles. 
Thus  the  questions  are  if  they  do  possess  the  characteristics  to  play  a  new  and 
efficient role in local banking market, if they can translate their constitutive features in 
a  modern  and  competitive  banking  setting,  and  how.  In  other  words,  given  the 
necessary  restructuring  that  also  these  financial  institutions  must  undergo  to  give 
adequate answers to their local customers‟ needs, one must inquire how long they 
may go on to benefit from their competitive position on the territory, due to lesser 
information costs in screening and monitoring loans, and easier, at least in theory, 
enforcing of repayments. 
 
 
5. Definition of problems 
 
The  main  challenges,  hastened  by  the  crisis,  that co-operative  banks  have  to face 
have three related roots: 
1.  increase in competition. With time, experts anticipate competition at the level of 
retail  banking,  i.e.  the  level  that  traditionally  financial  co-operatives  serve,  will 
increase. This not only from Commercial Banks, trying to recover on the field of 
relational finance, but also among Co-operative Banks themselves
8; 
2.  local identity. Although no one can deny that it is in that very local identity where 
the  strength  of  credit  co-operatives  stems  from,  it  should  be  stressed  that  in 
certain cases it encompasses some sources of danger; 
3.  growth and M&A. The most potential weaknesses of Co-operative Banks stem from 
their  scale  diseconomies.  Apart  from  the  pyramidal  form  of  the  organisational 
structure  of  credit  co-operatives  that  acts  as  a  cushion  for  such  difficulties, 
European credit co-operatives have opted for a more radical reaction during the 
last decade, i.e. that of mergers, which were in the forefront in terms of numbers 
within the European banking system. These decisions epitomise what is known as 
“consolidating” or “defensive” mergers, aiming at cutting costs and possibly also at 
diversifying  risks.  Notwithstanding  the  synergies  that  these  mergers  definitely 
create, they also alter some fundamental characteristics of the grass-root initiative 
(Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi, 2001; Di Salvo, Guidi and Mazzilis, 2002; Di Salvo, 
La Torre and Maggiolini, 1998). 
 
                                                 
8 Commercial Banks have received a bulk of money from States-EU-US government: are they allowed now to say that 
co-op banks are operating under a favourable tax status?   10 
 
 
From  these  three  general  sources  of  problems  stem  the  following,  intertwined, 
challenges. 
 
5.1. Difficulties in diversifying loan portfolios especially in a time of crisis 
 
An important source of difficulty refers to a credit co-operative‟s inability to diversify 
loan portfolio, in case local productive activities are relatively homogeneous or sector 
dependent  (Barham  et  al.,  1996).  In  this  case,  negative  shocks,  e.g.  a  decline  in 
output  prices,  can  lead  to  widespread  loan  default,  deposit-runs  and  the  loss  of 
financial viability unless external insurance of some form is available. The territorial 
concentration  of  the  loans  portfolio  in  a  strongly  specialized  area  may  in  fact 
exacerbate the impact on the local financial system of idiosyncratic shocks, turning 
banking localism from an element of stabilization into a factor amplifying crises in the 
district economy, and neutralizing the possible advantages that the local bank may 
derive  from  local  system  externalities  (closer  relations  with  firms,  informational 
advantages,  accurate  selection  of  debtors,  peer  monitoring  and  extra-economic 
sanctions  on  insolvent  debtors).  These  factors  may  explain  the  tendency  of  local 
banks to reduce their functionality to Italian industrial districts over time, and to thin 
out their presence, unless they have particularly close relations with firms (Baffigi, 
Pagnini and Quintiliani, 2000). 
 
On the other side, one should not neglect the existence of a mechanism whereby the 
banking  system  transmits  and  amplifies  the  economic  effects  of  a  geographically 
localized shock (regional credit channel). “When the local economy is hit by a crisis, 
banks  react  to  the  worsening  of the  financial  position of their  creditors  and  to the 
deterioration of their own balances by adopting more restrictive credit policies. This 
endogenous reaction tends to amplify and prolong the effects of the initial shock”. The 
effects are tendentially more intense in provinces where the banking system is more 
closed:  “The  existence  itself  of  a  local  credit  channel  seems  to  depend  on  the 
territorial segmentation of the banking markets. When the geographical diversification 
of  banks  is  limited,  the  impact  on  their  balances  of  local  economic  conditions  is 
stronger. By contrast, banks operating in several territorial areas are better able to 
off-set their difficulties in the crisis zone with the better results obtained in their other 
operational zones” (Beretta, Omiccioli and Torrini, 2000, p. 283; Baffigi, Pagnini and 
Quintiliani, 2000; Pagano, 2000). 
 
Along the same lines there appears to be a “need for the provision of special advices 
for entrepreneurs that operate in areas hit by the crisis”. This stresses the fact that in 
most cases personal knowledge and peer monitoring is not sufficient. Establishing and 
maintaining a long-term relation between a bank and an enterprise is not easy, even 
for a co-operative local bank with a particularly large share of local credit market. The 
bank  needs  a  clear  vision  of  strengths  and  opportunities  of  the  territory,  i.e.  a 
development vision and consulting capacity. It should improve its capacity to act as 
an agent of social change and development. The dialectic procedure inherent in such a 
social process, which is evidently present in the long history of financial co-operatives, 
has proved, that the scale diseconomies problems that arise in the implementation of 
this territorial approach should be addressed and solved within the apex institutions. 
The  “modernisation  of  the  financial  co-operatives‟  pyramidal  structure”  should  also 
refer to the development of appropriate services that could result to a meaningful and 
effective intervention at the local level. 
 
Moreover, these apex institutions may supply first level banks with low risk channels 
of investment for the surplus of savings, additional funds, insurance, supervision and   11 
 
 
regulation, counselling and training, endorsement and sponsorship. In order to have 
these  functions  performed  efficiently,  the  distinct  (two  or  three  in  some  countries) 
levels of co-operative banks must be able to collaborate in a modern way: the lower 
ones  giving  the  right  territorial  information  and  problems,  and  implementing  the 
proposed  solutions.  In  other  words  the  pyramidal  organisation  must  be  able  to 
conjugate the pros of both dimensions, to capitalize at the central level on the inside 
information and monitoring from the decentralized network, coherently with a shared 
social philosophy. Evidently, all this requires the modernization of the CCBs and their 
government and governance. 
 
5.2. Need of more sophisticated management and resulting agency problems
 9 
 
While  in  the  past  financial  co-operatives,  following  an  old  pattern,  were  run  under 
relatively  simple  administrative  practices  that  simple  management  schemes  could 
handle  easily,  with  growth,  the  need  to  employ  sophisticated  professional 
management  in  order  to  deal  with  the  more  complex  financial  situations  becomes 
inevitable (Huppi and Feder, 1989; Poyo et al., 1993). A quite simple example of the 
complexity in transactions that growth may cause can be offered if one argues that 
deposit  mobilization  may  generate  important  constraints  with  regard  to  liquidity 
management because of the uncertainty introduced by the unknown demand for cash 
of passbook depositors. Another one is the need to supply more sophisticated advice 
to entrepreneurs, which was elaborated above. 
 
On the other hand the qualitative and quantitative reinforcing of management may 
lead  to  the  separation  of  ownership  and  control  and  intensify  agency  problems 
(Emmons and Schmid, 1999 a and b; Leggett and Strand, 2002). The risk is either a 
misappropriation of co-operative funds on behalf of the management for its own use, 
or  a  corporate  philosophy  substantially  different  from  members‟  needs  and  will. 
Statistical evidence suggests that as financial co-operatives add membership groups 
and members, benefits are transferred from members to management. Management 
is able to channel residual earnings away from members – in the form of higher net 
interest margins – toward itself – in higher salaries and operating expenses. This last 
remark leads to a well known debate among co-operative theorists and practitioners, 
which refers to the governance mechanisms and representation of membership to the 
Board of Directors, aspects that are commented in the following points.  
 
5.3. Board of Directors: political aspirations, personal improvement, collusion 
 
As co-operative banks grow in dimension, the issue of the motivation of the members 
of the boards of directors becomes more relevant. What are the motives that induce a 
person  to  embark  on  this  role,  given  that  s/he  cannot  expect  substantial  direct 
economic profit from it? Working to create positive externalities for the community is 
not necessarily at odds with the pursuit of one‟s own broader interest. The directors 
may  have  a  particular  personal  interest  in  the  availability  of  the  public  good  in 
question (i.e. an efficient local bank), and may hence be willing to contribute more of 
their capabilities in order to achieve the result. However, it may happen that some 
directors have no particular  interest in the availability of the  public good. In these 
circumstances,  s/he  may  act  purely  out  of  altruism,  or  s/he  will  seek  to  acquire 
specific credits within the community – social status, for example, in order to promote 
her/his political career or to be appointed to some more lucrative post (perhaps, but 
                                                 
9 For general references on agency problems with coops management see: Borzaga and Depedri, 2008; Chaves and 
Sajardo-Moreno, 2004; Davis, 2001; Freeman, 1984; Frey and Osterloh, 1999; Tirole, 2001.   12 
 
 
not  necessarily  in  the  co-operative  network).  All  these  chances  are  related  to  the 
dimension and power both of the specific CCB and the co-operative network. 
 
The principal/agent problem forcefully arises. As they perform their role in the board, 
directors  have  their  own  interests  which  may  turn  collective  action  away  from  its 
initial goals, giving rise to less efficient solutions. The problem is even more serious 
when  the  role  of  director  is  performed  by  influential  individuals  without  a  direct 
interest in the availability of the local public good. In these cases it is more likely for 
such an individual to pursue his/her election to the board and to see it as a means 
towards ultimate goals not necessarily beneficial to the local society or even illegal. In 
general, the greater the member of the board direct interest in the availability of the 
public good (i.e. the greater his/her individual demand), the less likely will it be that 
his/her initiative is instrumental to other ends (Goglio, 1999). 
 
On these issues research is really poor and needed. However, in the Greek case, the 
almost complete defamation of the agricultural co-operatives during the 80s, which 
was mainly due to the intense state intervention and the consequent linkages of the 
co-operative leaders with political centres and power that led many co-operatives to 
bankruptcy (Papageorgiou, 2004) led to the foundation of credit co-operatives on a 
pure  entrepreneurial,  yet  co-operative,  financial  services  perspective  (Alexopoulos, 
2006). An interesting lesson was drawn from their successful initiative to the benefit 
of  the  entire  Greek  co-operative  movement,  i.e.  that  co-operatives  should  not  be 
considered  as  the  vehicle  for  exercising  state  social  policy  or a  means  for  local  or 
wider political  power,  but  as  private enterprises  aiming  at the  improvement  of the 
economic and social conditions of their members on the basis of their joint ownership 
and action. 
 
5.4. Problems of governance 
 
The increased number of membership may, also, add difficulties in adequate internal 
control as it promotes free riding by members (Ouattara et al., 1999; Ferguson and 
McKillop, 1997). Members feel disempowered as the institution adds new members, 
which  in  turn  creates  difficulties  in  making  existing  members  to  exercise  their 
ownership  rights  and  responsibilities  in  overseeing  management.  According  to  a 
number of recent surveys, member participation rates in board elections decline as 
credit co-operatives become larger. In any case, the absence of members from the 
general  meeting  deprives  them  the  possibility  of  coming  across  the  reasoning 
accompanying the operation of the co-operative bank. As a result, it can be said that 
they judge the performance of the bank mainly through their transactions with the co-
operative  bank,  having  no  idea  about  the  reasons  that  shape  the  character  of 
transactions and the consequences of the policy followed (Alexopoulos, 2006).  
 
In  many  cases  the  negative  replies  of members  in relevant  surveys  refer,  also, to 
ineffective general meeting. Such a reply is usually connected with the large numbers 
participating in the general meetings that render them ineffective and with the long 
distances that make access difficult. This recent M&A activity in the area of financial 
co-operatives  is  definitely  strengthening  the  validity  and  importance  of  this  last 
remark. Moreover, the distance from the seat of the credit co-operative, where the 
general meeting is normally held, acts as a barrier to participation. Some members 
give, also, as a reason of non-participation to the general meeting their insufficient 
knowledge  of  the  subjects  discussed,  or  even  allege  that  the  board  of  directors 
formulates the policy of the credit co-operative without taking into account the needs 
of  the  members.  The  result  of  these  problems  is,  again,  that  members  choose  to   13 
 
 
exercise  control  and  to  influence  the  co-operative  bank‟s  operation  through 
transactions  and  through  the  direct  local  contacts  with  members  of  the  board  of 
directors. Moreover, they measure the credibility of the board of directors by taking 
into account the position of its members to local society. But, however effective these 
ways of participation in the running of their co-operative may be considered, it is clear 
that  members  attempt  to  influence  the  results  of  the  policies  applied  and  not  the 
processes that produced these policies and, subsequently, results. Thus, co-operatives 
should  rather  adopt  rules  for  effective  functioning  of  their  highest  organ,  without 
falsifying their democratic character, such as distance voting and bylaw clauses on the 
possibility of holding meetings in separate locations
10. 
 
5.5. Weakened bonds 
 
When membership and assets grow beyond small numbers the importance of local 
knowledge  and  enforcement  might  decrease.  The  common  bond  looses  its  tight 
influence in maintaining a moral obligation of members to the co-operative. It can not 
be neglected that both the past success and the present revival of co-operative credit 
rest  on  the  commitment  to  the  communitarian  principle:  in  other  words,  on  the 
implementation  of  a  different  approach  to  financial  intermediation.  Therefore  it  is 
necessary to work either to restore or to strengthen the bond among co-operative 
values, members‟ participation and business, bond often ravaged by the market, as 
last financial vicissitudes have shown. In an era in which marketing departments of 
multinational banking institutions struggle to develop strategies in order to make their 
customers “feel” that they are part of their philosophy, to keep them “involved” and to 
“listen” to what they have to say of their performance, it is definitely a  luxury  for 
financial co-operatives to loose the close links with their membership
11. This could also 
be regarded as an effective answer to the problems that derive from the  “reduced 
local enforcement and peer monitoring capacity” within the financial co-operative that 
is most likely to arise when the – increased – membership retains loose links with its 
financial institution. Indeed, one may easily conclude that if the financial co-operative 
fails to develop a sound business record along with a meaningful local intervention 
capacity, the “moral obligation” among membership “to repay” should be expected to 
fade away. Although an urban setting is increasing the relevant difficulties that have 
to be addressed, it should be noted that in our point of view, regardless of the spatial 
setting within it is rooted, a financial co-operative should be aware that the increasing 
of  membership  can  also  lead  to  situations  which  threaten  its  institutional  and/or 
operative equilibrium, an issue that is further elaborated below. 
 
5.6. Conflict of interests and/or operational objectives 
 
Conflicts  between  the  interests  of  member-depositors  and  member-borrowers 
augment in a large-member financial co-operative (Smith et al, 1981; Smith, 1984; 
                                                 
10 For general considerations on co-operatives see Osterberg and Nilsson, 2009; Hariyoga, 2004; Caswell, 1987. For 
the debate on the governance of italian CCB see: Di Salvo and Schena, 1998; Panetta, 2005; Pittaluga, 1998; Santella, 
2001. 
11 It took 10 years of continuous decline in membership for Rabobank-Netherlands to re-consider the fact that it was 
its  co-operative  status  that  contributed  to  its  success  and  needed  to  be  revitalized.  Thus,  in  late-90s  Rabobank 
launched a strategy of maintaining closer links with its members, which, in 2000 alone, resulted in 210,000 new 
members joining the group and added 892 mil. euros to its equity. This result confirmed its leadership’s confidence 
that their co-operative background not only should not be regarded as a barrier for modern organisational forms but 
it constitutes an asset, a major competitive advantage that these initiatives enjoy in order to cope with the difficulties 
that the contemporary financial context poses.   14 
 
 
Patin  and  McNiel,  1991a  and  b).  Accommodating  each  group‟s  interests  influences 
heavily the operational character of the financial intermediary, which in turn leads to 
policy-problems  that  might  be  more  adequate  to  be  dealt  by  an  experienced 
management. Moreover, the insufficient  development of adequate participatory and 
monitoring  procedures  at  the  local  level  could  lead  to  the  “inability  of  a  large  co-
operative  to  detect  the  socio-economic  needs  of  members-customers  (and  the 
community‟s) and provide solutions”.  
In the turbulent banking scene that the crisis has created it should be expected that 
there would be an increased pressure towards the strengthening of equity and profits. 
But while for commercial banks these could be regarded as important indicators that 
characterise  sound  institutions,  it  is  well  known  that  their  importance  is  rather 
reduced under a co-operative point of view. Further, if financial co-operatives fail to 
pronounce  and  defend  efficiently  their  different  banking  philosophy,  such  a 
“commercial” approach on behalf of e.g. the regulation authorities, may lead to an 
“imbalance between the firm‟s profits and the members‟ surplus”. In other words, if 
financial co-operatives are trapped in a conventional banking assessment procedure 
and,  consequently,  mode  of development  and  operation,  the  “harmonisation of the 
firm‟s growth and local interest might prove to be difficult” to the detriment of course 
of local potential and capacity. 
 
Sharing  membership  in  a  credit  co-operative  is  not  related  only  to  the  better 
knowledge of participants‟ behaviour. It is related to an entirely different approach in 
financial  intermediation  through  which  the  demand  side  of  the  market  configures 
essential  features  of  the  supply  side.  Although  monetary  benefits  are  usually 
appreciated by members (i.e. the ones that accrue from high deposit interest rates 
and low interest loans) both members and credit co-operatives should agree that this 
is not the distinctive feature for the local economy. On the contrary, it should be clear 
that they do not need to trade off the qualitatively different banking approach against 
an aggressive price policy in order to be competitive. They have to be aware of the 
fact that, in the long run, this may hinder their development and deprive members 
and local society of the essential characteristics of their performance, which places the 
satisfaction of human and local needs at the centre of their operational objectives. 
 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
 
The paper has tried to illustrate the driving forces behind the current developments in 
the modern banking system. In this new context there appear to be both a need and 
an open space within market segments and localities for the active participation of co-
operative banks in order to facilitate macro and micro dimensions of the development 
process. Moreover it is argued that the critical side-effects on financial co-operatives 
were the outcome of the re-engineering within the sector before the recent financial 
crisis, with the latter intensifying some but, more importantly, rather creating more 
favourable conditions for their further expansion. Although there are a few papers in 
press that strengthen the hypothesis that the trend is positive for co-operative banks 
in Europe, compared to commercial banks, field researchers should have to wait for 
more recent financial data in order to describe the aftermaths of the crisis on the co-
operative banking sector. 
 
As it is, more or less, obvious that states and banking authorities are rather heading 
to a re-regulation of the banking system, the paper has tried to present and stress the 
importance  of  some  interesting  dimensions  of  the  distinctive  characteristics  of 
financial co-operatives which are considered as critical for their development. Thus, it   15 
 
 
should be mentioned that the future steps of co-operative financial intermediaries are 
in need of a regulation authority that will respect and treat with caution their different 
organisational and operating model. However, in order to appeal to such a treatment 
credit co-operatives should keep in mind that local societies do not run a co-operative 
institution for the sake of it: members seek for quality in services and products and 
support only sound institutions. Above all, it should be understood that these ventures 
need leaders from a committed local society and competent co-operative management 
that would reactivate the participatory procedures in order to challenge the difficulties 
in  a  highly  competitive  modern  banking  scene  and  facilitate  a  sustainable  local 
development procedure. 
 
If financial co-ops do not want to intensify moral hazard problems that, as argued 
earlier, will definitely arise with growth, they should urge the formation of adequate 
and  high  standard  internal  auditing  procedures.  It  is  obvious  that  the  benefits  of 
having strong financial co-ops with adequate organisational features, such as mutual 
guarantee  funds  and  monitoring  procedures,  spread  to  the  society  as  a  whole, 
because in the absence of the above mentioned features the taxpayers would have to 
face higher-risk and potential costs. Thus, a combination of ownership form, common 
bond  requirements,  supervision  and  monitoring  restrict  risk-taking  for  financial  co-
operatives.  It  is  in  the  density  and  quality  of  the  different  formal  and  informal 
characteristics of the mutual institutions were success lays. 
 
Credit co-operatives are social and economic organisations. In their dual capacity they 
have historically managed to help local societies that saw in the co-operative form the 
means  to  serve  their  needs.  Much  of  the  literature  on  financial  co-operatives  was 
tempted to admit that financial co-operatives seem to be “appropriate technology” for 
relatively backward economies. Furthermore, it was often argued that these initiatives 
should become less important in the process of economic development as individuals‟ 
market opportunities expand. Thus, one should expect financial co-operatives to fade 
away  or  disappear  altogether  as  economic  development  proceeds.  The  very  late 
developments lead to the suggestion that the co-operative form of organisation, not 
only  did  not  disappear  with  economic  development  in  industrialized  countries  but, 
proving  its  flexibility,  is  considered  to  be  among  the  fastest  growing  groups  of 
financial institutions in some advanced nations today. Their long history has proved 
that they are in the position to adapt to any conditions, innovate and re-define the 
local potential. 
 
However, what should be kept in mind is that the historical and cultural variety found 
throughout the areas of the world means that no simple or linear development path 
can be prescribed for all credit co-operative endeavours; their development in reality 
varies  under  the  influence  of  historically  specific  and  contemporary  economic  and 
social conditions. In the same time, it should also be kept in mind that co-operative 
credit is a flexible mechanism, not necessarily associated to simple or backward social 
and economic systems: its organisation can and should evolve in coherence with the 
development  of  the  territories  where  it  operates.  In  the  same  way  the  national 
institutional  and  legal  framework  should  evolve:  in  particular  it  should  help  the 
evolution  of  CCBs  in  a  not  strictly  business-like  way,  acknowledging  the  different 
approach  to  perform  banking  activities  by  coop  banks,  and  placing  bonds  and 
incentives consequently. 
 
The most original feature of co-operatives is to provide for the material needs of their 
members as well as to respond to their fundamental aspiration for greater dignity in 
their lives. Dignity, however, should not be limiting its importance at the individual   16 
 
 
level  but  at  the  level  of  collective  action  as  well.  In  other  words,  in  an  era  when 
competition has blurred the lines between a pure commercial and a co-op enterprise, 
credit co-operatives face a major challenge: to re-establish the - lost in a market logic 
approach  -  link  between  co-operative  values,  members  active  participation  and 
commercial strategy and practice. 
 
Hence,  if  co-operative  banks  can  succeed  in  addressing  the  above  mentioned 
problems, without loosing their financial stability and operational character, they could 
proceed to substantial innovative initiatives that will permit them to become agents of 
local development, providing that they will have a) a well chosen, well prepared and 
competent  Board  of  Director  and  management,  with  deep  and  solid  co-operative 
training  and  knowledge,  and  b)  a  committed  membership,  which  means  that  they 
have to work more on retaining close everyday links to a membership that increases 
in numbers and demand. 
 
Current trends in local development theories and programmes call for interventions 
that  seek  to  mobilize  endogenous  resources,  support  active  participation  and 
collective action, emphasise on empowerment in order to enhance capabilities of local 
people.  These  are  considered  as  the  prerequisites  that  foster  the  “involvement”  of 
local  actors,  “unlock”  local  potential  and  act  toward  the  implementation  of  a 
sustainable development process. 
 
But if these are the prerequisites for development to be sustained at the local level, 
then  it  seems  that  the  co-operative  institution,  and  even  more  the  co-operative 
institution which is active in the critical sector of credit, could “fit efficiently” in such a 
multifaceted  process.  Thus,  the  real  potential  of  these  membership  based 
organisations can be implemented if they manage to turn to agents of social change 
and development. 
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